El Chapo’s extradition: a grotesque violation to the Constitution of Mexico that might be in accordance with the Constitution of the United States of America?

 In amparo, human rights, means of mexican constitucional control, state

When a particular person, like the Mexican national, mister Joaquín Archivaldo Guzmán Loera (better-known as Joaquín el “Chapo” Guzmán), commits a crime that might be under the jurisdiction of a different country from that where that person may be located in, then other country can require to that country for that person to be extradited. 

Different countries follow different systems. One example of such can be found in the “all-closed” Russian Federation, that never extradites persons, not even, per chance, the American national, mister Edward Joseph Snowden.

In the case of Mexico, the extraditions can occur only if in accordance with the Mexican Magna Carta, with higher protection to Mexican nationals, since that act is a sovereign act, and the Mexican sovereignty resides in the people. 

Hence, if the Executive authorised an extradition that imply a direct violation to the Constitution of Mexico, under, for that purpose, an inexistent excuse, to a different state of the American Union; if such, that state of the Union cannot have logically properly admit it, due to the fact that the courts that required it, were from different states; thus, this and any analogical case, emerge as grotesque violations to the federal constitutions of Mexico, and, subsequently, of the United States of America; going, at minimum, against the union and independence of the countries and its states, and the equal protection guaranteed in the fourteenth amendment and in article one, of, respectively, any of both paramount laws of the lands. 

So we need to start by clearly stating that there is a massive misunderstanding between “States” (the Swiss Confederation, the Republic of Colombia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the State of Israel, etcetera), and “states within the American Union” (Kentucky, California, Alaska, Washington, etcetera); for that reason, article 17, point 1, section c, of the Extradition Treaty Between the United Mexican States and the United States of America, signed in Mexico on May 4, 1978, cannot apply, since refers to the consent given by the asked part for a person to be detained, processed, sanctioned and extradited to a “third State (id est, for such purpose, the Swiss Confederation, the Republic of Colombia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the State of Israel, etcetera)”, not to any other of the states within the American Union (id est, Kentucky, California, Alaska, Washington, etcetera); this, then, if so, for a different crime than that for which the extradition was originally given, but, thus, logically, to conclude in a third (different) “country (State)”.   

So, under article 14 of the International Law of Extradition, related with article 9, section 1, of the Extradition Treaty Between the United Mexican States and the United States of America, the above mentioned cannot comprise the exceptions given by it to the Executive to extradite own nationals, since those are to give that particular person to a foreign State (id est, the Swiss Confederation, the Republic of Colombia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the State of Israel, etcetera), not to any (“other”) of the states comprised in the American Union (id est, Kentucky, California, Alaska, Washington, etcetera). 

For idem reasons, anything done under such illegality is one hundredth percent against the Constitution of Mexico, and may be against that of the United States of America, too; since is not solely violating the jurisdictions of other states within the America Union, but by it (Mexico) imposed to be processed as if was directing it to a third State (country), a person (Mexican national) who was going to stay in that (second) country (State (id est, the United States of America)). 

Thence, logically, under those basis, the case was (is), in omnia, incorrectly admitted by the United States of America, after being sent following such grotesque violations to the Constitution of Mexico and to the Mexican law, affecting, alas, the rights of a Mexican national, as “el Chapo” is, no matter the conducts or crimes for which was, or can be, claimed to be responsible for, in any other country whatsoever. 

Therefore, the Mexican State not solely failed to respect article 10, section III, of the Law of Extradition, by this Mexican national being extradited and submitted to trial, under an incompetent court, lacking, thus, the formalities of the law, etcetera; but has persisted and persist doing so, while, under article 35, related with article 10, sections II, III, IV, V, VI and VII, of the Law of Extradition, is failing to ask the United States of America, for the immediate release of such Mexican national, since is logically impossible for there to be a crime to ask for the extradition, evidence or proofs of it, of the probable responsibility, a ruling, the definition of the crime and of the punishment, the prescription of the action, its application in time and space, the text of the order of arrest, the personal data of the potential criminal, etcetera; since is logically impossible for it to occur (moreover under article IV, section 3, subsection 1, of the Constitution of the United States of America); is totally invalid, therefore, to pretend hypothetical criminal acts to exist before courts that exercise jurisdiction (under article III, section 2, subsection 3, of the Constitution of the United States of America) in different states of the American Union (id est, California and Texas), than (and from) the one (New York) to which such Mexican national was extradited to, in first instance. 

Recent Posts

Comment

Search